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Abstract: 
Since the 1990s, coordinated welfare capitalism has been subject to comprehensive change, 
with workfare measures and the deregulation of employment protection at the heart of labor 
market reforms. Developments in Sweden, Germany, and South Korea not only challenge the 
assumption of relative stability that is commonly associated with the study of coordinated mar-
ket economies, but also the assertion that this stability is associated with the persistence of 
established political coalitions. Instead, we contend a collapse of old welfare state coalitions as 
key political driver of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous 
welfare settlements at the center of this development. 
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The Politics of Labor Market Reform in Coordinated Welfare Capitalism: 
Comparing Sweden, Germany, and South Korea 
 
Over the last 20 years, labor markets across the OECD have been subject to comprehensive 
change, with workfare measures and the deregulation of employment protection at the heart of 
labor market reforms. Whilst workfare and little employment protection have long been key 
features of the liberal welfare capitalism of the Anglophone world1, strict labor market recom-
modification is a more recent phenomenon in the welfare capitalism of Northern and Conti-
nental Europe, where coordination between the state, business, and labor allowed for greater 
levels of egalitarianism and social solidarity.2 In East Asia, state-led coordination achieved 
high levels of employment during the period of late industrialization, which produced low lev-
els of social inequality despite very residual social welfare provision. However, sharp increases 
in unemployment in the wake of the economic crisis of the late 1990s undermined the ‘welfare-
through-work’ system, and subsequent labor market deregulation accelerated this erosion.3  
In this article, we assess the development of labor market policy in three coordinated 
market economies (CMEs); namely, Germany, Sweden, and South Korea. Whilst the Varieties 
of Capitalism (VoC) dichotomy of liberal and coordinated market economies tends to underap-
preciate differences within CMEs in particular4, we underline the variation in the welfare/pro-
duction regime in CMEs. Admittedly, all three cases have traditionally been characterized by 
high employment protection, but presented themselves very differently with regard to social 
welfare provision. Germany is the archetypical CME with a conservative-corporatist (or Bis-
marckian) welfare state, whereas Sweden is the prime example of social-democratic welfare 
                                                        
1 Esping-Andersen 1990; Gilbert 2004. 
2 Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2012. 
3 SC Lee 2012; Miura 2012. 
4 Cf. Hall and Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001. 
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capitalism.5 Although Japan is widely considered the prototype of the developmental state6, the 
Korean case represents the archetype of the developmental welfare state, where modest social 
policy “is intimately linked with and subordinated to the supreme goal of economic develop-
ment.”7 Recent labor market reforms in these three critical cases in the study of CMEs call into 
question ‘orthodox’ claims of policy stability that dominate much of the institutionalist welfare 
state and political economy literature.8 Even though we have seen the emergence of a large 
body of theoretical institutionalist literature discussing institutional change and its sources in 
advanced political economies9, the predominant literature continues to downplay the scope of 
change that advanced welfare capitalism (especially, in CMEs) has been experiencing over the 
last 20 years. Most prominently, Thelen identifies distinct varieties of liberalization, with which 
she supports the claim that different forms of welfare capitalism remain distinct.10 Looking at 
the case of Sweden, Thelen acknowledges comprehensive liberalization weakened coordina-
tion mechanisms, but she insists that the Swedish variant of liberalization did not compromise 
social solidarity.11 By contrast, Germany saw a decline in social solidarity in the wake of du-
alization, but this did not significantly compromise coordination that is typically associated 
with social partnership. In fact, coordination between business and labor is seen as the driving 
force behind dualization.  
Challenging this perception of coordinated welfare capitalism, we argue that labor mar-
ket reforms in Sweden –entailing retrenchment, workfare measures, and labor market deregu-
lation– have involved an erosion of social solidarity. As far as the German case is concerned, 
we agree that social solidarity has been on the decline since the mid-1990s, but we also find a 
                                                        
5 Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001. 
6 Johnson 1982. 
7 Ringen, Kwon, Yi, Kim and Lee 2011, 31f. 
8 Hall 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pierson 2004. 
9 Deeg and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005. 
10 Thelen 2012. 
11 See also Steinmo 2010 on the resilience of the Swedish model. 
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collapse of the cross-class compromise of the post-war settlement driving this transformation 
of the labor market. Lastly, calling into question the mainstream East Asian welfare state and 
political economy literature, we show a decline of the state in Korea, where economic liberal-
ization and democratization have undermined the steering capacity of the state.  
This study of the critical cases of Sweden, Germany, and Korea shows that labor market 
reforms starting in the 1990s have successively undermined the defining feature of each world 
of coordinated welfare capitalism – that is social solidarity in Sweden, corporatism in Germany, 
and the developmental state in Korea. However, not only does this research challenge the as-
sumption of relative stability that is commonly associated with the study of CMEs, we also 
contest the assertion that this stability is associated with the persistence of established political 
coalitions. Instead, we contend, across all three cases, a collapse of old welfare state coalitions 
as key political driver of labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous 
welfare settlements at the heart of this development. Before the investigation of Sweden, Ger-
many, and Korea in greater detail, we examine the politics of labor market reforms, which 
allows us to conceptualize our empirical findings and discuss the drivers of labor market reform 
in the three case studies in comparative perspective.  
 
The Politics of Labor Market Reform 
Much of the welfare state literature of the advanced political economies of the ‘West’ has been 
dominated by the power resources approach (PRA), which essentially argues that the generos-
ity of welfare states and the decommodification of workers are associated with the strength of 
social democracy and organized labor. This approach assumes a basic antagonism between the 
welfare state and the market, as the costs of social policy undermine the profitability of busi-
nesses. Employers are accordingly perceived to be opponents of the welfare state as its being 
an intervention into their autonomy, whereas social-democratic parties, as the ‘natural allies’ 
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of organized labor, are thought to challenge employers’ interests in capitalist societies. There-
fore, the welfare state is depicted as a distributional struggle between labor and business, in 
which left parties and trade unions are the driving forces behind the expansion of social policy 
and social citizenship.12 The social-democratic power resources literature greatly relies on the 
Scandinavian experience and, especially, on the paradigmatic case of Sweden. 
In Continental Europe, however, Christian rather than social democracy was the key 
architect in welfare state building.13 Admittedly, the Christian-democratic welfare state (such 
as the German exemplar) is concerned with status preservation and risk pooling through Bis-
marckian social insurances rather than vertical redistribution; this should, however, not deflect 
from the principal ‘pro-welfare’ stance of Christian democrats. It is also worth noting that 
Christian democracy received considerable political support from workers, and their ‘labor’ 
wings had great political weight.14 Thus, while social democracy might have been the preferred 
ally of trade unions, many workers and trade unionists found a political ‘home’ in Christian-
democratic parties with their distinct welfare state project. And, in fact, trade unions and skilled 
workers often preferred Bismarckian earnings-related social protection over Swedish-style 
egalitarianism, as the former was considered to offer a ‘better deal’ to industrial workers.15  
PRA and the related parties-matter thesis (with the Christian-democratic ‘modifica-
tion’) appear powerful for explaining the emergence of welfare states and their divergent de-
velopment during the Golden Age, but accelerating globalization and de-industrialization raise 
the question as to whether partisan difference has been blurred in the face of socio-economic 
pressures. Whilst Korpi and Palme argue that partisan differences have persisted in the era of 
retrenchment and global market integration16, Mishra describes social democrats as ‘reluctant 
                                                        
12 Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983. 
13 Kersbergen 1995. 
14 Manow and Kersbergen 2009. 
15 Baldwin 1990. 
16 Korpi and Palme 2003; see also Allan and Scruggs 2004; Huo, Nelson and Stephens 2008. 
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modernizers,’ who might not want to engage in welfare retrenchment but cannot escape struc-
tural pressures confronted with the ‘imperatives’ of globalization.17  
From a rational-choice point of view, Rueda also questions the conventional wisdom 
that the interests of the working classes are well represented by social democrats and organized 
labor, assuming greater conflicts between labor market insiders and outsiders after the end of 
the Golden Age. The former are not expected to show much interest in generous unemployment 
protection and active labor market policy. Not only do these policies primarily benefit labor 
market outsiders, they also involve a heavier tax and/or social insurance contribution burden 
on insiders, as well as greater wage competition and corresponding downward pressure on 
wages. Instead, insiders favor strong employment protection, reducing their risk of becoming 
outsiders. When the interests of these two groups collide, the insider/outsider partisanship the-
orem expects social democrats and organized labor to prioritize the interests of insiders over 
those of outsiders, as insiders form the core constituency of both social-democratic parties and 
trade unions. Outsiders, by contrast, engage less in the political process (as expressed in low 
electoral turnouts) and show lower levels of unionization.18  
Turning from political parties and organized labor to employers, the VoC approach 
highlights possible business support for social policy expansion with the argument of a nexus 
between public welfare provision and skills formation. In particular, CMEs relying on firm- 
and industry-specific skills (i.e. skills of low portability) face a critical challenge, as risk-averse 
employees (as well as employers) may shy away from making investments into these skills in 
an uncertain future environment. However, comprehensive employment protection and gener-
ous unemployment benefits are viewed as providing an institutional framework that encourages 
workers to invest in specific skills. Whilst firm-specific skills are said to be best supported with 
                                                        
17 Mishra 1999, see also on the limited steering capacity of the state: Scharpf 2000.  
18 Rueda 2007. 
7 
 
high levels of employment protection (reducing the risk of unemployment; as exemplified by 
the Korean case), generous earnings-related unemployment protection is most important for 
the formation of industry-specific skills as a means to protect ‘skilled wages,’ as exemplified 
by the German case. Although Sweden with its social-democratic welfare state is underex-
plored in the VoC literature, it is seen as broadly corresponding with the German case.19 
Against this background, social policy is argued as complementing the production regime in 
CMEs. In fact, without sufficient social and employment protection in place, this literature 
anticipates market failure in the formation of specific skills. For this reason, employers in 
CMEs with heavy reliance on industry-specific skills in particular are expected to support so-
cial policies facilitating skills formation. Accordingly, the VoC literature makes the proposition 
of a “strong alliance between skilled workers and their employers in favor of social protec-
tion.”20  
Comparing PRA and VoC, the difference in coalition politics is straightforward. The 
former views the alliance of social democracy and the labor movement as being at the heart of 
generous welfare states (with employers opposing social policy expansion), whereas the latter 
considers cross-class coalitions with employers supporting certain social policies, presuming 
these contribute to skills formation. As PRA, VoC has been criticized for its bias towards sta-
bility and failing to account for paradigmatic institutional change. In this literature, the stability 
bias has its foundation in the concept of institutional complementarities, which captures the 
idea of linkages between sub-systems of the economy (such as the welfare state and skills for-
mation).21 Institutional complementarities provide strong incentives to stick with an existing 
institutional configuration, and political economies are accordingly expected to follow their 
                                                        
19 Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Mares 2003. 
20 Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, 147. 
21 Hall and Soskice 2001, 17. 
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paths.22 Yet, socio-economic change, such as globalization, could be expected to alter the (per-
ceived) benefits of particular institutional settings. For this reason, an actor that previously 
endorsed an institutional equilibrium might withdraw support in the face of dwindling benefits 
(or even incurring costs), which might have far-reaching implications for the political founda-
tions of institutional settings. Old political coalitions might fall apart (destabilizing institutional 
reproduction), and new coalitions engaging in institutional redesign might arise.  
While political parties and social partners have a prominent place in the analysis of 
‘Western’ political economies and welfare states, these actors are regarded as largely insignif-
icant in the study of East Asian welfare states. Influenced by the developmental state thesis 
with its focus on the steering role of the state in the economic development in East Asia, the 
mainstream scholarship on East Asian social policy, the developmental welfare state approach, 
explains the development of social policy in the region as a state-led process that is closely 
embedded in the project of economic development.23 Coinciding with the period of industrial-
ization, the welfare state in the region was institutionalized during the authoritarian regimes in 
Korea (1961-1987) and Taiwan (1949-1987), and the ‘soft-authoritarian’ regime in Japan 
(1948-1993) wherein the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated the political 
system.24 In policy-making, bureaucrats were given substantial autonomy; and they pursued 
economic development first and foremost, as the regimes in East Asia sought to legitimize their 
rule by delivering growth and employment. In this context, it was understood that the welfare 
regime in the region was shaped by growth-oriented bureaucrats, who subordinated all aspects 
of state policy to the objective of economic growth through industrialization. Limited social 
policy was promoted, not in terms of social citizenship, but to facilitate industrialization. As a 
                                                        
22 Hall and Thelen 2009; Palier and Thelen 2010. 
23 Tang 2000; HJ Kwon 2005. 
24 Johnson 1987. 
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matter of principle, bureaucrats wanted to minimize welfare expenditures. 25  Rather than 
providing social welfare, the state preferred the role of regulator, imposing the costs of social 
welfare on non-state actors, especially on employers.26 
Compared to all-powerful bureaucrats, business influence in policy-making was lim-
ited. Certainly, employers enjoyed privileges as the state’s ally in its bid for rapid industriali-
zation, but in the end state always had the upper hand in the so-called ‘developmental alliance,’ 
as the government set directions and used incentives, or sometimes even disciplinary measures 
(such as tax probes), to ensure business compliance.27 By contrast, labor unions had no mean-
ingful influence over policy, because governments suppressed them as potential opposition 
forces.28 Enterprise unionism was promoted, which prevented unions (especially those of large 
enterprises) from developing an interest in national level agendas (such as social policy) and 
incentivized them to focus on particularistic interests (namely, employment protection, wages, 
and enterprise welfare).29 Political parties as such also played an insignificant role in social 
policy development. Opposition parties were weak, while incumbent parties largely delegated 
policy issues to bureaucrats. Parties were seen as personalistic rather than programmatic in 
Japan, and simply non-programmatic in Korea and Taiwan.30 The observation that social policy 
was introduced and advanced under conservative authoritarian regimes with little involvement 
of political parties led to the conclusion that social policy development in East Asia cannot be 
explained by partisanship.31  
The political landscape, however, changed with democratic transition and consolidation 
from the late 1980s. Whilst the ‘democratization’ literature acknowledges the emergence of 
                                                        
25 Gough 2004; Holliday 2000. 
26 Huck-Ju Kwon 1997. 
27 Johnson 1987; Woo-Cumings 1999. 
28 Deyo 1987. 
29 Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Wong 2004. 
30 Rosenbluth and Thies 2010; Wong 2004. 
31 Goodman and Peng 1996. 
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qualitatively different welfare politics and highlights the importance of electoral competition 
(though in somewhat vague terms)32, little attention is paid to political parties in the democratic 
era. The literature also fails to pay sufficient attention to trade unions and employers as actors 
in policy-making. Unable to move forward from the conventional view that trade unions in the 
region are preoccupied with particularistic interests, the role of organized labor in the reform 
is understood to be secondary, merely following the lead of civic groups, at best; and employ-
ers’ associations are still seen as being in the ‘shadow’ of bureaucrats. In the following, we 
examine labor market reforms and their politics in Sweden, Germany, and Korea as critical 
cases in the comparative political economy and welfare state literature. 
 
Labor Market Reforms in Sweden: The Decline of Social Solidarity 
The Swedish welfare state presents the prime example of comprehensive decommodification, 
univeralism, and vertical redistribution based on the idea of social citizenship. Social-demo-
cratic welfare provision is generous and is credited with a long track record of low social ine-
quality and poverty by international standards; and, indeed, a high level of social solidarity is 
widely considered the defining feature of social-democratic welfare capitalism.33 In the domain 
of the labor market, the Swedish model is characterized by generous unemployment benefits 
through voluntary, state-subsidized unemployment insurances, combined with a long tradition 
of employment protection and active labor market policy (including extensive training pro-
grams).34 Despite the acknowledgement of some change, the Swedish welfare state is typically 
perceived in terms of great continuity, where social-democratic ideas governing social policies 
persist during difficult times.35 Historically, the Swedish welfare state is associated with the 
                                                        
32 Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Wong 2004. 
33 Esping-Andersen 1990; Baldwin 1990. 
34 Sjöberg 2011, 209f. 
35 Cox 2004; Thelen 2012. 
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political power of the social-democratic party (SAP) in conjunction with a strong labor move-
ment, as earlier discussed in the power resources approach. However, the literature also high-
lights the role of employers in creating generous welfare states. Whilst the mainstream VoC 
literature focuses on social policies with a wage replacement function (such as unemployment 
benefits) and their contribution to industry-specific skills formation, Swenson, with reference 
to post-war Sweden, shows that employer support can extend to active labor market policy. In 
the context of labor shortages in the 1940s and 1950s (which increased competition between 
employers for skilled labor, and accordingly put upward pressure on wages), initiatives for the 
expansion of employment promotion (namely, investments in training and measures increasing 
geographical mobility) received strong support from organized business – allowing for a broad 
cross-class coalition.36  
The Swedish post-war system of unemployment protection, however, was put under 
enormous stress during the global economic crisis of the early 1990s, which might be consid-
ered a critical juncture for the Swedish model.37 The country’s GDP dropped by 5 percent, and 
unemployment rose dramatically from 1.5 to almost 10 percent. Unsurprisingly, the crisis pro-
duced an enormous public deficit. The social-democratic government was replaced by a center-
right coalition (1991-1994), which pursued an economic strategy of deregulation, structural 
reform, and austerity. As part of larger austerity efforts, the new government led by the Mod-
erate Party reduced the generosity of unemployment benefit and terminated early retirement 
for labor market reasons. Critically, the automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling to changes 
in the manufacturing sector was abolished, with which the real value of the unemployment 
benefits was significantly undermined over time and effectively turned into a flat-rate system 
                                                        
36 Swenson 2002. 
37 Schnyder 2012. 
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for the great majority of benefit recipients.38 According to the Comparative Welfare Entitle-
ment Dataset, the replacement rate for an average production worker with family dropped 
sharply from 89.2 percent in 1991 to 64.4 percent in 2011 (from 87.5 to 60.3 percent for a 
single person) – Sweden thus losing its status of exceptional benefit generosity.39 In addition 
to retrenchment in unemployment protection, the country also saw the deregulation of employ-
ment protection for temporary workers on different occasions (from 4.08 in the early 1990s to 
0.81 in 2008, according to the OECD Employment Protection Index; this pushes Sweden below 
the OECD average of 1.75). By contrast, regular employees have experienced only insignifi-
cant labor market deregulation over the last 20 years.40 
We find that, starting with the economic crisis in the early 1990s, Swedish labor market 
policy experienced a gradual transformation changing the face of social protection for the un-
employed and employment protection. Labor market reforms driven by the center-right gov-
ernment appears, at first glance, to provide support for the power resources model, as a coali-
tion of the political right implemented retrenchment and workfare measures. However, it is 
critical to acknowledge that the social-democratic opposition, by and large, supported retrench-
ment and workfare in the face of the global economic and associated fiscal crisis.41 From this 
point of view, Swedish social democrats might be described as ‘reluctant’ reformers who might 
not have a genuine preference for retrenchment (unlike parties of the political right) but who 
‘surrendered’ to perceived imperatives.42 Ryner highlights the importance of globalization on 
the perceived feasibility of the Swedish model of welfare capitalism43, and Swank and Timonen 
elaborate, with specific reference to the economic crisis of the early 1990s, that the conjuncture 
                                                        
38 Sjöberg 2011. 
39 Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2014. 
40 OECD 2015. 
41 Anderson 2001. 
42 Cf. Mishra 1999. 
43 Ryner 2004. 
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of globalization (most notably, international capital mobility but also the increasing multi-na-
tionalization of Swedish companies) and fiscal crisis put downward pressure on the welfare 
state by, more generally, undermining macro-economic policy autonomy.44 With a similar im-
petus, Klitgaard as well as Lindvall underline the importance of economic constraints and fiscal 
pressure for the ‘market-oriented’ reforms of social democracy.45 Crucially, in light of the eco-
nomic crisis, the SAP moved ideologically towards the political center and gave up its objective 
of full employment – a cornerstone in traditional social-democratic economic and social pol-
icy.46 To understand the ‘neo-liberalization’ of Swedish social democracy, Ryner draws atten-
tion to the importance of employers adopting a ‘Thatcherite political orientation’ and their mo-
bilization for neo-liberal reform, which had an immense impact on senior economic policy-
makers in social democracy and their perception of feasible economic and social policies.47 
Thus, accepting the ‘imperatives’ of globalization, social democrats effectively accepted a shift 
in power towards employers with their ‘exit’ option.  
Business, as documents reveal, took indeed an increasingly outspoken approach against 
social welfare and employment protection. Specifically, employers pressed for the deregulation 
of the labor market making it easier to hire and fire staff. Comparing Sweden with its Danish 
neighbor, employers noted that the Danish economy benefits from outsourcing, whilst the Swe-
dish one did not, which was argued to be associated with the great flexibility of the Danish 
labor market. Thus, this observation was used to reinforce business calls for the deregulation 
of the Swedish labor market.48 In addition to this policy lesson from Denmark, employers 
                                                        
44 Swank 2002; Timonen 2003. 
45 Klitgaard 2007; Lindvall 2010. 
46 Seeleib-Kaiser, Van Dyk and Roggenkamp 2008. 
47 Ryner 2004, 106. 
48 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 7; see also Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
2012, 15. 
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looked at the Continent, and identified the Netherlands as a “European leader in the labor mar-
ket field.”49 Besides labor market deregulation, the Netherlands were praised for the restruc-
turing of unemployment protection (including reduced unemployment benefits and stricter el-
igibility criteria) and for reducing marginal taxes on labor income and reduced payroll taxes. 
Employers viewed the benefit and tax system increasingly critically: “The high marginal taxes, 
complemented with generous transfer systems, are to blame for diminishing the incentive to 
work.”50 It was called for increasing the gap between labor incomes and transfer incomes by 
reducing marginal tax rates, funded through “larger restraints on public spending on services – 
first of all on transfer payments.”51 As for labor costs, employers pushed for reductions in order 
to maintain the competitiveness of investments and production in Sweden, and employers’ 
contributions to social protection were viewed particularly critical. Contextualizing labour 
market and social policy preferences, employers highlighted the country’s changing place in 
the world economy and explicitly identified globalization as the “most important change” for 
Swedish businesses – this “leads to the strategic decisions on the future of a company to an 
ever greater extent being taken against the backdrop of a global perspective.”52 Whilst it was 
acknowledged that Sweden had been long dependent on international trade for prosperity, em-
ployers argued that, after 1990, the globalization of the Swedish economy had seen a “giant 
leap,” and as an important consequence “the relevance of the old Swedish model of negotiation 
(…) is diminishing.”53 
With this sharp change in preferences, employers departed from the previous politics 
of compromise that long characterized the Swedish model, but took an “aggressive neoliberal 
                                                        
49 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2009, 33. 
50 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 11. 
51 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise et al. 2005, 42; see also Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
2012, 15. 
52 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2007, 2. 
53 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2007, 29. 
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posture,”54 which challenges the idea of the persistence of cross-class alliance in CMEs in the 
face of globalization. The VoC proposition that “firms and workers have common interests to 
defend because they have invested in many co-specific assets, such as industry-specific 
skills”55 does not seem to have sound empirical foundation in recent Swedish labor market 
policy. In pursuit of their interests, employers funded university departments to promote neo-
classical economic teaching and professionalized their media work to promote changes in pub-
lic attitudes, in addition to more direct interventions into the political process through the fund-
ing of conservative politicians, such as Carl Bildt of the Moderate Party who became prime 
minister of the center-right coalition in the early 1990s.56 Employers’ new “politics of confron-
tation”57 and dissatisfaction with the status quo manifested itself most strongly when, in 1991, 
business, with great symbolic power, removed their representatives from the boards of most 
government agencies, including the Labor Market Board (AMS) with responsibility for active 
labor market policy.58 We thus not only observe firmer linkages between employers and the 
political right, but also a deliberate business strategy of abandoning corporatist institutions, 
which previously served as important means of interest mediation. Politically, employers’ 
withdrawal from the post-war welfare settlement left social democracy and organized labor 
increasingly vulnerable; and there is “no doubt that the desire to weaken LO’s [the Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation’s] political clout was a prime motivation for SAF’s [the Swedish 
Employers Association’s] broader push to weaken Swedish tripartism in general.”59 With a 
similar impetus, Steinmo concludes that employers “came to believe that the LO and Social 
                                                        
54 Huber and Stephens 2001, 241. 
55 Hall and Soskice 2001, 58 
56 Agius 2007, 590. 
57 Pestoff 1994, 102. 
58 Gould 2001. 
59 Huber and Stephens 2001, 253. 
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Democrats could no longer be trusted.”60 Employers’ increasingly critical stance towards or-
ganized labor was broadly shared by the Moderate Party, which displayed some significant 
hostility towards unions (especially, with the attempts to nationalize the union-run unemploy-
ment insurance funds).61 Thus, unlike their German counterparts, the Swedish labor movement 
had no significant links with the center-right, which seriously undermined unions’ political 
capacity when social democracy took place on the opposition benches. 
After returning to government in the second half of the 1990s, the SAP continued on 
the path of welfare state restructuring despite much resistance from organized labor, indicating 
an increasing rift between the two sides. As for unemployment protection, social democrats 
further reduced benefit generosity and tightened the sanction regime in order to cope with the 
financial pressures they faced.62 Thus, the SAP in opposition not only supported retrenchment 
by the center-right in government, they continued on this trajectory when they returned to 
power, as social democrats (against strong opposition from unions) pushed labor market de-
regulation. In fact, it has been argued that the total sum of retrenchment by the SAP exceeded 
the cuts made by the center-right coalition.63 The government also looked into other options 
for reducing costs; including the abolition of the so-called ‘requalification condition,’ which 
since the 1980s had allowed the building up of new unemployment benefit entitlements through 
participation in labor market programs. However, this proposal was met with rather strong 
union opposition, and was eventually dropped. When relations with unions further deteriorated, 
the government re-raised the unemployment benefit replacement rate (though financed with 
cuts elsewhere), which could be viewed as a measure to appease organized labor.64 This epi-
sode is important, as it shows that unions were still in a position to exercise some (though 
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increasingly limited) influence on the SAP, even though the party had successively departed 
from traditionalist labor market and social policy. In this context, it is also critical to note that, 
despite increasing ideological distance and conflicts between SAP and organized labor (espe-
cially, the LO), institutional linkages between the two sides persisted, and that the party con-
tinued to rely on unions’ financial support and their mobilization of union members in general 
elections.65 Thus, social democrats find themselves in the difficult position to balance the per-
ceived necessity of programmatic modernization and the need to maintain reasonably good 
relations with their old ally. 
At the beginning of the millennium, the SAP, in addition to raising the ceiling for un-
employment benefits, introduced further changes in labor market policy, wherein activation 
was addressed more explicitly. The government eventually removed the re-qualification con-
dition, and replaced it with the so-called ‘activity guarantee’ as a new program for the long-
term unemployed, combined with a tightening up of job-search criteria and the sanction re-
gime.66 Whilst trade unions broadly supported these changes (though unsuccessfully demand-
ing more generous benefits), employers showed much skepticism. The latter called for even 
tougher job-search criteria and considered the raising of the benefit ceiling as giving a wrong 
signal to the unemployed, resulting in longer unemployment. Organized business also re-
mained unconvinced of the benefits of the activity guarantee, calling instead for a reduced tax 
burden to promote job growth.67 Whilst the ‘activity guarantee’ might suggest some renewed 
labor market policy activism on behalf of the social-democratic government, it is important to 
note here that, overall, we have seen active labor market policy becoming less prominent in the 
Swedish policy-mix, and a sharp decline in spending since the 1990s. With 2.8 percent of GDP 
in the first half of the 1990s, spending on active labor market policy peaked, but dropped to 1.0 
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percent in 2009 despite an unemployment rate of more than 8 percent (which compares with 
unemployment levels in the late 1990s when Sweden spent more than 2 percent of GDP on 
active labor market policy). Looking at training measures (which are at the core of ‘social-
democratic’ activation), we observe a collapse in spending with a fall from 1.0 percent of GDP 
in the early 1990s to 0.1 percent of GDP in 2009; with this, Sweden became a low spender in 
its efforts to improve the employability of jobseekers.68 In light of these figures, it is not sur-
prising that it has been argued that Swedish policy-makers (including social democrats) ‘lost 
faith’ in traditional active labor market policy, which of course has huge implications for the 
previous strong focus on human capital investments69 – suggesting the erosion of a key pillar 
of the Swedish model across the political spectrum.  
These reforms did not translate into greater electoral support for the government. In the 
2006 election, a coalition led by the Moderate Party defeated the social-democratic govern-
ment. The new government continued on the path of restructuring unemployment protection, 
and in fact accelerated the speed of restructuring.70 As a measure of high symbolic power with 
great implications for social solidarity in society, the government increased the financing fees 
for insurance funds, which translated into considerably higher membership fees and sharply 
declining membership, especially among low-income workers.71 After the failure to nationalize 
union-run unemployment insurance funds in the early 1990s, this can be interpreted as another 
attempt by the Moderates to weaken organized labor. Whilst there is some evidence that the 
differences between the political left and right have diminished since the 1990s, we find that 
the Moderate Party campaigned aggressively on the issue of employment, and did not disguise 
its policy program of cutting unemployment benefits in order to boost job growth.72 Among 
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the different social policy programs, retrenchment of unemployment protection could be con-
sidered an electorally smart strategy, as labor market policy receives less electoral support than 
most other social policies.73 So, it might be viewed as the ‘weakest link,’ and Davidsson and 
Marx suggest that the Moderates used retrenchment in unemployment protection for political 
credit claiming.74 Lindvall and Rueda argue that social democrats lost the confidence of labor 
market insiders in particular, in the face of the Moderate Party campaigning for unemployment 
benefit cuts and presenting itself as the ‘new labor party’ – corresponding with the argument 
that insiders have no strong interest in generous unemployment protection.75 Thus, Svallfors 
might conclude that the social-democratic welfare state is thriving and more popular than ever 
in Sweden. Yet, changes in the support for unemployment protection need to be noted. Admit-
tedly, employment policy experienced an increase in public support in the 2000s, but this 
should not deflect from a considerable erosion in public support in the previous 20 years.76 
This secular decline of social solidarity among voters, it appears, allowed the Moderate Party 
to pursue a strategy of selective welfare state retrenchment, and the confirmation of the party 
in government in the 2010 election indicates the political viability of this strategy.  
These developments in labor market policy from the early 1990s suggest a considerable 
decline in social solidarity in Sweden, as far as the unemployed and labor market outsiders are 
concerned. Unemployment protection has seen a reduction of benefit generosity, in addition to 
the strengthening of workfare. At the same time, human capital investment has lost its previous 
importance in the Swedish policy-mix. With comprehensive labor market deregulation, tem-
porary workers have also experienced a greater exposure to the market. Recommodification 
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has gained much more prominence in Swedish labor market policy. The argument of unchal-
lenged social solidarity in Sweden is further undermined by a considerable increase in poverty. 
From the mid-1990s to 2011, the poverty rate in Sweden after taxes and transfers (60 percent 
poverty line) more than doubled to 17.4 percent, with which Sweden reached UK poverty levels 
(17.0 percent) and exceeded poverty in Germany (15.0 percent). Admittedly, Sweden, with a 
Gini coefficient (post taxes and transfers) of 0.273 in 2011, still displays less income inequality 
than the UK (0.344) and Germany (0.293). However, since the early 1990s, income inequality 
has seen a marked increase (0.209 in 1991); and, by 2011, the country has lost its status of 
exceptionally low income inequality (see, e.g., Belgium: 0.264, Denmark: 0.253).77 Whilst the 
most comprehensive labor market restructuring was pushed by the political right, it needs to be 
acknowledged that social democracy also engaged in retrenchment, workfare policies, and la-
bor market deregulation. For this reason, even though some differences between the main po-
litical parties persisted (for instance, conflicts over replacement rates), it has been suggested 
that Sweden has experienced a decline in the importance of partisanship in labor market pol-
icy78, which presents an important challenge to the power resources model. Paradoxically, one 
might argue, intense political conflict between the two main political blocs has persisted despite 
the narrowing down of programmatic differences. It has also been pointed to great conflict 
between the social partners and the breakdown of corporatism, with the social partners failing 
to develop a common understanding of the problem of unemployment.79 In addition to very 
conflicting views on labor market policy, low levels of trust are observed.80 This has made it 
rather difficult to assume the cross-class compromise that has long been associated with the 
Swedish model of welfare – especially with the withdrawal of employers, which (contrary to 
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the VoC skills argument) increasingly challenged the social-democratic welfare state of the 
Swedish model in the face of globalization. The crumbling cross-class compromise provided 
the political foundations for the successive decline of social solidarity in Sweden. Yet, whilst 
the ideological shift of social democracy suggests the possibility of a new broad coalition with-
out labor, the SAP’s need to at least partly accommodate trade union views (in addition to the 
more severe political conflicts after the end of social-democratic hegemony, the breakdown of 
corporatism, and the associated lack of trust among labor market elites) make it difficult to 
identify a new, meaningful political coalition at the heart of Swedish labor politics that can 
compare with the previously stable, cross-class coalition of the Golden Age.  
 
Labor Market Reforms in Germany: The Decline of Social Partnership 
As the prime example of a CME81, Germany has received much attention in the comparative 
political economy literature, and its welfare state has been used to illustrate employer interests 
in generous social protection. Bismarckian social insurance legislation created a system of 
earnings-related social protection geared towards core industrial workers, complemented with 
strong employment protection. To cope with social change, the social insurance state, priori-
tizing horizontal redistribution, expanded over time to include other groups rather than estab-
lish universal citizenship-based rights (as seen in the Swedish case of vertical redistribution).82 
The institutionalization of the Bismarckian welfare state is typically associated with the polit-
ical rationale of integrating the working classes into the young German nation state.83 Although 
the initial impetus for the Bismarckian welfare state can clearly be located in the political realm, 
the system of earnings-related social protection is thought to have met the criteria of functional 
feasibility as well by facilitating economic coordination and a production regime based upon a 
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highly skilled workforce. This provided, as VoC theory contends and discussed earlier, an in-
centive structure for both employers and employees to invest in skills (especially in industry-
specific skills), which formed the functional foundations for broad cross-class support in favor 
of the Bismarckian welfare state and, specifically, generous earnings-related unemployment 
protection and strong employment protection.84 The social partnership of employers and trade 
unions underpinning the Bismarckian welfare state is widely considered a defining feature of 
the conservative-corporatist welfare regime. 
In the wake of the economic crisis of 1966/67 (when Germany first experienced reces-
sion and increasing unemployment rates after its post-war ‘economic miracle’), the system of 
employment promotion was comprehensively modernized with the 1969 ‘Employment Promo-
tion Act,’ which displayed some similarity with the Swedish approach to active labor market 
policy. This legislation (pursuing the objective of full employment, productivity, and economic 
growth) placed a strong focus on human capital investments to cope with the consequences of 
structural change. Improving the skills profile of the workforce by further vocational training 
and retraining was considered decisive in the preventive approach of the Employment Promo-
tion Act, as job creation programs were pursued to improve skills and assist structural change. 
The importance ascribed to a skilled workforce was also reflected in the protection of occupa-
tional status and the prescription to avoid ‘substandard employment;’ essentially, employment 
not meeting the minimum standards set in collective agreements.85 This legislation passed par-
liament unanimously and received great support across the political spectrum, including prin-
cipal support from employers.86  
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This early focus on human capital investments, however, was rather short-lived. The 
economic crises of the 1970s and accelerating de-industrialization driven by technological pro-
gress (especially, improvements in productivity) increased unemployment, and confronted pol-
icy-makers with unknown challenges. To cope with rising unemployment figures, strategies to 
reduce the supply of labor featured very prominently. Especially the center-right government 
of the Christian-democratic Chancellor Kohl (1982-1998) promoted large-scale early retire-
ment. At the same time, fiscal pressures typically translated into cutting measures that had 
improved the skills of jobseekers and the employed.87 With the ‘welfare-without-work’ strat-
egy of early retirement, the Kohl government improved the politically very sensitive unem-
ployment figures, and also social partners benefited from early retirement. It offered large firms 
an attractive tool for ‘externalizing’ the costs of laying off older employees in corporate re-
structuring in order to increase productivity, imperative in an environment of high non-labor 
costs like Germany. This ‘productivity whip’ accelerated the process of de-industrialization. 
These corporate strategies received broad support from trade unions in affected industries, as 
their members also benefited from publicly subsidized early retirement. Consequently, em-
ployment losses in manufacturing and early retirement became one of the main drivers of ex-
penditure expansion of the post-war welfare state.88 
Here, it is important to underline that the cross-class coalition of large employers and 
manufacturing unions, which had earlier provided critical support for the stabilization of the 
Bismarckian welfare state, persisted and backed the ‘welfare-without-work’ approach of early 
retirement. This is not to argue that there were no voices in government and business for a 
‘neo-liberal turn.’ Thelen highlights that organized business was internally divided, and was 
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eventually reluctant to call into question long-standing institutions without having a clear al-
ternative at hand.89 It is also worth noting that the rather strong labor wing in the Christian-
democratic party operated as a partisan veto player within the government.90 Apparently, the 
interests of workers, typically associated with social democracy, were not unrepresented in the 
center-right government, but had a powerful voice with trade unionists in Christian democracy. 
As noted earlier, this was rather different to the experience of labor in Sweden during the rule 
of the political right. 
The political landscape changed in the aftermath of unification in 1990, which resulted 
in a massive increase in unemployment in East Germany. Following the ‘routine response’ to 
a rise in unemployment, the Kohl government engaged in large-scale early retirement and job-
creation programs.91 However, the approach of ‘welfare without work’ was increasingly con-
sidered unfeasible because of its great financial costs. The Kohl government restructured labor 
market policy, by putting a stronger emphasis on workfare measures, in addition to reducing 
the generosity of early retirement schemes in order to make these less attractive. The legislation 
of the late 1990s also formally gave up the objective of full employment. For the ‘tougher’ 
stance in labor market policy in the last Kohl government, a shift in the political strategy of 
organized business appears critical, as observed in the Swedish case. Starting from the mid-
1990s, employers showed increasingly open hostility towards the welfare state of the German 
model. With support from the liberals (who wanted to sharpen their ‘pro-market’ profile within 
the government), employers pressed the Kohl government for a neo-liberal turn and compre-
hensive welfare cuts.92 Employer documents show: whilst retrenchment in unemployment pro-
tection had not featured prominently on the agenda of employers in the first half of the 1990s93, 
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we find, a few years later, the rise of a rather skeptical approach towards unemployment bene-
fits and employment promotion, where benefits were considered to promote welfare depend-
ence and measures of active labor market policy were viewed as failing to deliver the skills 
needed for labor market integration. Accordingly, employers called for reduced benefit gener-
osity and shorter unemployment benefits. In the long term, it was proposed to reduce the max-
imum benefit to 60 percent of the average wage, by which unemployment insurance would 
effectively turn into a flat-rate benefit for many jobseekers (especially skilled workers, who 
should profit from unemployment protection according to VoC). Furthermore, employers put 
forward the merger of unemployment and social assistance at the level of the latter, comple-
mented with better ways to combine the receipt of benefits and employment to ‘make work 
pay.’ With respect to employment promotion, it was demanded that a greater focus be put on 
immediate reintegration into the labor market (concentrating on youth and long-term unem-
ployment), for which wage subsidies and short training measures were suggested, whereas job-
creation schemes were rejected as costly and ineffective programs.94 These proposed labor 
market reforms, as in the Swedish case, are obviously at odds with the VoC skills argument, 
according to which employers and workers have common interests to defend. Instead, changed 
business preferences undermined the cross-class coalition underpinning the Bismarckian wel-
fare state. 
As a result of resolute business mobilization for neo-liberal policy, the employer wing 
within the Christian-democratic party gained political influence, whereas the labor wing saw 
its power dwindling and partisan veto disappearing. Importantly, business calls for welfare 
state restructuring were part of a broader debate on Germany as an industrial/business location 
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in the context of intensified competition in the ‘global economy’ (the so-called Standortde-
batte). In this globalization discourse, the reduction of (non-wage) labor costs was moved cen-
ter stage in order to improve the competitiveness of German businesses and to tackle the per-
ceived ‘cost crisis’ of the German welfare state – this line of argument was very similar to the 
concerns raised by Swedish employers. Critically, the globalization discourse was shared 
across the political spectrum, even though social democrats initially continued to oppose labor 
market restructuring.95 Here, it is important to highlight the changing position of social democ-
racy, as it indicates that the party started ideologically shifting in the 1990s in response to the 
perceived ‘imperatives’ of globalization. With these developments, displaying considerable 
similarities with the experience of their Swedish counterparts, social democrats effectively ac-
cepted a shift in power towards business – with huge implications for future social democratic 
governments. In the last Kohl government (1994-1998), organized labor tried to regain political 
influence with an initiative for a tripartite ‘Alliance for Jobs’ between the government, busi-
ness, and trade unions. This Alliance, which had no equivalent in Sweden, quickly fell apart 
when the center-right government continued to push its agenda for welfare state restructuring.96 
With employers’ gradual withdrawal from the cross-class alliance, the political equilibrium for 
labor market policy experienced a critical destabilization – and the crumbling of the cross-class 
alliance for Bismarckian unemployment protection continued under social-democratic leader-
ship in government. So, as with the Swedish case, social democrats in Germany underwent a 
change in their approach to social welfare.  
The Red-Green alliance (1998-2005) came to government office without a great master 
plan for welfare and labor market reform. Inspired by the success of social concertation in the 
Netherlands, Chancellor Schröder invited the social partners for talks to revitalize the Alliance 
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for Jobs in order to overcome the widely perceived reform gridlock. Social democrat Schröder 
was confident that he would be more successful in social concertation than his conservative 
predecessor. However, the Red-Green Alliance for Jobs did not prove to be particularly suc-
cessful either, as government and social partners did not achieve shared problem analysis to 
develop a consensual reform agenda, which resembles the Swedish case. Neither employers 
nor trade unions were prepared to make any meaningful concessions for an ambitious labor 
market and welfare reform in consensus, and the Chancellor did not show sufficient political 
leadership and authority to have allowed political exchanges between the parties involved, 
which (also similar to the Swedish experience) have seen a sharp decline in trust. Unsurpris-
ingly, the labor market reform of the first Red-Green government was of rather cautious char-
acter, focusing on the improvement of job placement. Substantive investment in human capital 
through training programs was prevented by the Ministry of Finance and ‘modernizers’ in the 
social-democratic parliamentary party, whereas ‘traditionalists’, with support from organized 
labor, vetoed any benefit cuts or other workfare measures (as pushed for by modernizers who 
sought to ideologically move the party towards the center with support from the Chancellor).97 
Accordingly, trade unions largely welcomed the reform (though demanding more employment 
promotion for jobseekers), whereas employers took a more critical stance (calling, for instance, 
for a tougher sanction regime and labor market deregulation).98 The labor market reform was 
widely perceived as not meeting the challenge of (long-term) unemployment, but a more com-
prehensive reform was considered politically unfeasible in the run-up to the 2002 general elec-
tion.  
In early 2002, the scene changed dramatically with a scandal around manipulated place-
ment statistics at the federal employment service, which provided a window of opportunity for 
                                                        
97 Blancke and Schmid 2003. 
98 European Industrial Relations Observatory 2001. 
28 
 
comprehensive labor market reform. Chancellor Schröder set up the so-called Hartz Commis-
sion for the development of reform proposals; and after its re-election, the Red-Green govern-
ment, with social-democratic modernizers in the ‘driving seat,’ used the commission instru-
mentally for agenda-setting in the reform of the labor market. Although the report of the Hartz 
Commission did not include explicit proposals for curtailing benefit generosity (demanded by 
employers but vetoed by trade unions)99, the actual Hartz Legislation – challenging power re-
sources theory – involved some major retrenchment and workfare with the merger of unem-
ployment and social assistance at the benefit level of the latter, and a reduction of unemploy-
ment benefit duration. Furthermore, labor market policy saw some significant change with the 
deregulation of employment protection for temporary workers and the promotion of atypical 
employment.100  
In the politics of the Hartz Legislation, it is critical that the placement scandal and 
agenda-setting through the Hartz Commission allowed the Schröder government to largely ex-
clude trade unions from labor market policy-making and to minimize the influence of social-
democratic traditionalists. Both, previously vetoing reform proposals by social-democratic 
modernizers, were seen as defenders of the status quo in labor market policy, which was heavily 
discredited by the failings of the employment service. Providing momentum for ‘radical’ re-
form, the employment agency scandal allowed the sidelining of organized labor, as well exem-
plified in the composition of the commission. Of its 15 members, trade unions were only al-
lowed to send in two representatives, whereas eight commission members were associated with 
business interests (including the commission’s chair). This marginalization exceeded the expe-
rience of Swedish trade unions, which also faced problems with their social-democratic party 
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ideologically moving towards the political center. In this new political environment, compre-
hensive workfare policies became possible that had not been politically feasible in the first 
Red-Green government.101 Streeck contends that the Hartz Commission signaled the ultimate 
failure of tripartite social concertation as represented by the Alliance for Jobs, which eventually 
heralded the end of the corporatist century.102 Importantly, the break with corporatist policy-
making resulted in isolating trade unions, but not the neglect of employers. In fact, the Hartz 
Legislation shows some significant overlap with business demands from the late 1990s103; and 
indeed employers showed great contentment with the legislation, whereas trade unions ex-
pressed their sharpest opposition.104  
Thus, whilst Bismarckian unemployment protection rested upon a strong cross-class 
consensus for most of the last century, we have been observing a disintegration of this consen-
sus with the withdrawal of employers from the second half of the 1990s. Organized business, 
in a broader globalization discourse, called for comprehensive labor market restructuring, 
which appears largely incompatible with the bias to stability in the VoC approach. The depar-
ture from the previous cross-class compromise and the new political stance of German employ-
ers are well reflected in the setting-up of the so-called ‘New Social Market Initiative’ in 2000 
as a well-funded neo-liberal think-tank with the mission to influence economic and social pol-
icy-making. It is important to underline that this think-tank goes back to an initiative of the 
employers’ association of the metalworking industry.105 This is worth noting, since this indus-
try, with its reliance on industry-specific skills, should be the one least interested in the dis-
mantling of the German model and its social insurance system.106 Hence, the assumption of a 
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stable cross-class alliance with its foundation especially in the manufacturing industry107 and 
its interest in industry-specific skills formation has become ever more difficult to perceive in 
welfare politics. In this context, it is worth noting that employers are not only operating in an 
environment of globalization, but also that the German economy has been experiencing accel-
erating de-industrialization. While much of the VoC literature, despite pointing to labor market 
and welfare dualization108, emphasizes continuity in the German welfare/production regime, 
the VoC argument of a linkage between generous social protection and specific skills formation 
might also suggest that de-industrialization and the corresponding decline in specific skills 
have successively undermined the German system of earnings-related unemployment protec-
tion.109 
To conclude, business mobilization for neo-liberal reform and the globalization dis-
course had a huge impact on both Christian and social democracy; and within the ‘social part-
nership,’ power resources shifted towards business. With the greater prominence of employer 
preferences in political parties (where we observed a decline in programmatic difference, as in 
Sweden), unions were successively marginalized in labor market policy-making – at first 
through the declining influence of the labor wing in the Christian-democratic party, and then 
through the loss of power of the traditionalists and trade unions in the social democracy. Thus, 
the break with corporatist policy-making increasingly isolated organized labor, whereas em-
ployer preferences gained weight across the political spectrum indicating a ‘grand coalition’ 
without labor.  
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Labor Market Reforms in South Korea: The Decline of the Developmental State 
Korea has been typically classified as a developmental welfare state, in which social policy 
was regarded as handmaiden to the economy, and where a dominant state was at the heart of 
the economic modernization project. During the period of industrialization from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, the Korean state steered economic coordination among capital and labor in pursuit 
of speedy ‘catch-up’ with advanced economies. At the core of this state-led coordination was 
the developmental alliance, a coalition between the state and business, to nurture ‘national 
champions’ (especially, large business conglomerates; the so-called chaebols) in strategic in-
dustries that could compete in the global market. The project required long-term investments 
for which the state engineered a system of patient capital. Through direct and indirect control 
of the banking sector, the state ensured the supply of long-term, low-interest credits, in addition 
to industrial subsidies. The state’s control over finance is widely considered the most important 
aspect of the developmental state, as it made it very difficult for companies to ignore the state’s 
expectations.110 In contrast to its dominant role in coordinating economic development, the 
state performed a marginal role in social welfare provision, unlike the experiences in the CMEs 
of Sweden and Germany with their primary concern for industry-specific skills formation. In-
stead, the Korean state imposed welfare provision on employers, which had to bear the costs 
of enterprise welfare111 and high employment protection.112 According to the VoC line of ar-
gument, we would expect Korean employers to accept these costs willingly, as generous com-
pany welfare provision and high employment protection are deemed to encourage workers to 
commit to firm-specific skills formation113; and, in fact, many and especially large employers 
exceeded statutory requirements in enterprise welfare provision. The predominance of firm-
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specific skills is critical for understanding the much greater prominence of enterprise welfare 
in Korea, as compared to Germany and Sweden; and unlike the European CME experience, 
public welfare provision was undesirable from an employer’s point of view, as it did not pro-
mote but rather undermine firm-specific skills formation. To achieve a conducive long-term 
employment system, the authoritarian state effectively enforced a no-lay-off policy at large 
firms114; and, as a result, core workforces (i.e. male regular workers in large manufacturing 
enterprises) enjoyed de-facto lifetime employment115, in addition to extensive company wel-
fare.116  
These characteristics of the Korean developmental welfare state underline the centrality 
of work, resembling the Japanese model of ‘welfare through work.’117 The Korean state also 
emphasized job creation through public work schemes and infrastructure investments rather 
than social safety nets as a means to eradicate poverty.118 The absence of unemployment pro-
tection and generally very residual public welfare provision meant extremely low levels of 
decommodification. Yet, the welfare-through-work model performed well during the period of 
industrialization due to high economic growth, allowing the booming manufacturing sector in 
particular to absorb migrant workers from rural areas.119 
From the perspective of PRA, the high level of commodification in the Korean welfare 
state can be understood as an outcome of the exclusion of organized labor in policy-making. 
The labor movement was severely repressed – not only because this was deemed necessary to 
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achieve wage restraint and industrial peace for economic development, but also labor was con-
sidered a possible opposition force to the regime, as discussed earlier.120 While industrial un-
ions were outlawed, enterprise unions were promoted. This was because the former would have 
facilitated the mobilization of the working class as a political force, and the latter limited union 
activities to company-level issues.121 As political activities of unions were prohibited, they 
were neither able nor inclined to engage in broader issues of public policy.122 Thus, the politics 
of the Korean developmental welfare state can be explained in terms of a state-business coali-
tion which promoted a welfare-through-work model in order to facilitate firm-specific skills 
formation, whereas labor was excluded from social policy-making.  
The developmental welfare state and its state-business alliance experienced increasing 
pressure in the mid-1990s with the decline of the coordinating capacity of the state. The success 
of state-led industrialization resulted in an alteration of the power balance between the state 
and business, as chaebols had become to control large parts of the economy by the end of the 
1980s; and democratization towards the end of the decade allowed them to exercise a louder 
voice. With greater confidence, business demanded neo-liberal reform, as the Swedish and 
German employers did, calling for an end to excessive state intervention in the financial and 
labor markets. Moreover, similar pressure for the liberalization of the Korean economy came 
from the United States, which became, after the end of the Cold War, increasingly intolerant 
towards the substantial trade deficits with Korea and the Korean government’s protection and 
control of its domestic market. Thus, the American pressure to push back the government’s 
strong grip on the economy strengthened the position of employers. In this context, the con-
servative Kim Young-Sam government (1993-98) pursued a set of so-called ‘liberalization re-
forms.’ The infamous Economic Planning Board was abolished, and the financial sector was 
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liberalized allowing firms entrance into the non-bank intermediaries sector as well as greater 
access to equity markets and foreign credit. At the same time, industrial subsidies had been 
almost phased out, largely due to mounting budget deficits.123 Once the state relinquished its 
control over corporate finance (i.e. the key tool of state-led coordination), business no longer 
depended on the state for its success; and in the following we observe that business became 
very outspoken about its unwillingness to bear the costs of high employment protection. When 
global competition was becoming fiercer, employers, in parliamentary hearings and policy doc-
uments, articulated their strong preference for neo-liberal labor market reform, arguing that 
high labor costs and rigid employment regulations were the very sources of the declining com-
petitiveness of the Korean economy. They threatened to ‘hollow out’ the manufacturing indus-
try by relocating production to developing countries, especially China, unless reforms to in-
crease the flexibility of the labor market were implemented (notably, the legalization of layoffs 
and temporary agency work).124 It was argued that increased global competition no longer al-
lowed the retention of redundant workers created by the automation of production lines since 
the late 1980s (which appears similar to the ‘productivity whip’ at German workplaces). Em-
ployers also began to show an increasing unwillingness to shoulder the burden of company 
welfare provision.125 Employers’ push for employment deregulation and retrenchment in en-
terprise welfare challenges the VoC proposition that, in CMEs with a high reliance on firm-
specific skills, employers would support high employment protection and company welfare to 
promote the formation of such skills. Instead, we find employers using a rhetoric of cost pres-
sures and globalization that resembles the arguments of their German and Swedish counter-
parts. 
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At the same time, the state’s loss of grip on labor became also obvious during the Kim 
Young-Sam government. Playing a pivotal role in democratization, the power of the labor 
movement had been on the increase. As the Kim government was still reluctant to fully incor-
porate organized labor in the policy-making, unions used their newly obtained power to achieve 
particularistic interests – often employing militant tactics. Wage increases were exceptional, 
especially among large firms, far higher than the government wage guidelines. Rising labor 
costs contributed to a declining competitiveness among Korean industries, as well as a widen-
ing wage gap between workers of large and small enterprises, which amplified existing labor 
market dualism.126 
In awareness of the rising power of organized labor, the government attempted to 
‘trade’ some limited unemployment protection for desired labor market deregulation in order 
to appease unions for the loss of job security that deregulation would cause. Business accepted 
the government’s proposal most reluctantly as the price to pay to realize its policy priority of 
labor market liberalization.127 For organized labor, however, unemployment protection was 
low on the agenda at this early stage of democratic transition; and therefore employment de-
regulation in exchange for meager unemployment protection were simply unacceptable. When 
the incumbent conservative party passed a government bill permitting layoffs in case of man-
agerial needs, the two rival national labor federations came together to launch a general strike. 
The strike displayed the new powers of organized labor in democratic Korea128, and the gov-
ernment, unprecedentedly, was forced to postpone the implementation of the labor market re-
form bill for two years, opening up the possibility that the bill could be scrapped by a new 
government.  
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The departure from the welfare-through-work model, initiated by the conservative Kim 
Young-Sam government, was unexpectedly consolidated during the center-left Kim Dae-Jung 
government (1998-2003). The East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, with unemployment ris-
ing from 2.5 to 8.7 percent and a massive 5.8 percent drop in GDP, revealed the increased 
vulnerability of Korea in the global economy, especially with largely unregulated flows in 
global capital but also the great export orientation of Korean manufacturing companies and 
their ability to relocate production.129 Unlike patient capital engineered by the state, much of 
foreign capital was quick to exit Korean firms in the crisis, resulting in an unparalleled scale 
of bankruptcies across the economy (including chaebols). Critically, the increasing importance 
of short-term profit maximization made the pursuit of full employment increasingly untenable. 
For the firms to better adjust to a changing business cycle and external environments (in addi-
tion to remain attractive for foreign capital), greater labor market flexibility was deemed critical 
across the political spectrum, and also pushed for by the US-dominated International Monetary 
Fund. In the wake of the crisis, the new government, thus, immediately implemented the post-
poned labor market liberalization, which translated into a considerable increase in atypical em-
ployment (approximately 35 percent of all wage-earners according to conservative estimates) 
– thus reinforcing labor market dualism and greatly contributing to rising income inequality.130 
The erosion of employment protection, a key pillar of the welfare-through-work model, 
was accompanied by a growth in social welfare provision. In the young Korean welfare state, 
unemployment protection experienced a considerable expansion with the universalization of 
the unemployment benefit (though still modest by international standards). Unemployment 
protection was extended to all full-time workers and later on to some atypical workers.131 Fur-
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thermore, non-contributory unemployment protection policies underwent a significant expan-
sion: the public assistance scheme was extended to the able-bodied for the first time, providing 
a functional equivalent of unemployment assistance, and public work schemes were used for 
those who still fell outside unemployment insurance.132 Essentially, these reforms were geared 
towards protecting labor market outsiders (namely, employees of small firms and atypical 
workers) against the risk of unemployment. It should be highlighted that the expansion of un-
employment protection, especially non-contributory programs, was increasingly financed by 
general taxes. This is to say that the state took on a new role in welfare provision, moving away 
from its previous role as a ‘regulator’ of welfare.133 In a nutshell, labor market reform during 
the Kim Dae-Jung government considerably undermined the welfare-through-work model by 
expanding social protection for the unemployed and by undermining job protection for the 
shrinking number of insiders.  
Behind what can be described as the Korean version of flexicurity was the transfor-
mation of Korean welfare politics. The economic crisis created a critical juncture that allowed 
the rise of a reform alliance of the left, which could be interpreted in terms of power resources 
theory. On the one hand, the crisis facilitated a change of government. For the first time, the 
center-left party won the presidential election, as the electorate wanted to punish the conserva-
tives for its mismanagement of the economy. On the other hand, the crisis played a key role in 
the center-left party and unions making a critical policy u-turn with the acceptance of labor 
market deregulation.134 Witnessing a series of bankruptcies of chaebols (which were long re-
garded as ‘safe havens’ of employment), leaders of both labor federations arrived at the under-
standing that it was impossible to defend high employment protection. This ‘turnaround’ of the 
political left towards accepting labor market liberalization, together with the conservative party 
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and business pushing for labor market deregulation since the mid-1990s, indicates that the pre-
vious full employment model of welfare through work was effectively abandoned by both the 
political left and right. 
However, it should be highlighted that, despite accepting ‘retrenchment’ in the form of 
labor market deregulation, the reform coalition of the left seized the opportunity to champion 
the welfare state. This alliance, much to the surprise of insider/outsider theory, promoted espe-
cially an expansion of social protection towards labor market outsiders (i.e. employees of small 
firms, workers in atypical employment, and the unemployed). Within the alliance, labor feder-
ations took a leading role in advocating the welfare rights of labor market outsiders, and the 
center-left party followed the unions’ advocacy.135 This begs the question why, contrary to the 
common perception that Korean labor movements did not promote the welfare state, unions 
shifted their priority from particularistic interests, largely benefiting insiders, to the expansion 
of the welfare state, mostly for outsiders. Once again, the crisis played a key role. For organized 
labor, it was an eye-opener to the limits of enterprise unionism in the era of globalization. In 
the wake of the crisis, employers were quick to abandon their commitment to lifetime employ-
ment and generous company welfare benefits. The state had no power over employers to rein-
force the old welfare-through-employment system. For the labor movement, pursuing the old 
strategy of material gains at company level increasingly became a dead end. Also, this strategy 
caused a popular criticism of ‘self-serving’ behavior benefiting only labor market insiders and 
neglecting an ever-increasing number of outsiders. Hence, public support for unions had been 
on a steep decline, causing an existential crisis of the labor movement.136 Thus, labor federa-
tions endeavored to ‘reinvent’ the labor movement to reestablish itself as a legitimate political 
force. In this context, advocating the rights of outsiders was deemed imperative. This new 
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strategy of labor federations, however, created a schism between federations and company un-
ions. While most enterprise unions (especially, those of large workplaces) were still occupied 
in protecting the prerogative of insiders, labor federations placed a greater emphasis on the 
expansion of the welfare state for outsiders.137 
Against this background, labor federations advocated the extension of unemployment 
insurance to employees of small enterprises, and part-time and daily workers. Moreover, the 
‘radical’ federation, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, was at the center of the civil 
society’s campaign for a public assistance reform in order to extend its coverage to the unem-
ployed. While much of the literature highlights the role of civil society, we underline not only 
the contribution of organized labor, but also the importance of the center-left party in overcom-
ing resistance from the old alliance of bureaucrats and employers in the reform of unemploy-
ment insurance and public assistance. Critically, the party successfully portrayed the old alli-
ance as being responsible for the crisis – due to their collusive relationship, with bureaucrats 
overlooking reckless corporate expansion and high leveraging that put the Korean economy 
into unprecedented turmoil and unemployment. This strategy of political scapegoating created 
widespread anti-sentiment towards the old alliance and especially chaebols, taking away much 
of their political influence. In other words, unlike the experience in Sweden and Germany, 
employers were perceived as part of the problem in Korea, and crisis was associated with 
‘crony capitalism.’ Capitalizing on the huge swing in the public opinion against the old alli-
ance, the center-left president Kim Dae-Jung was able to break some considerable opposition 
among bureaucrats138, as he could afford ignoring employers’ strong opposition to the expan-
sion of social protection. Thus, whilst globalization politically strengthened the power position 
of employers in Sweden and Germany (making their positions acceptable across the political 
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spectrum), Korean business was severely discredited by the East Asian financial crisis, opening 
up a window of opportunity for the improvement of unemployment protection that was skill-
fully used by the Korean left.  
To summarize, the rise of the political left, paradoxically, consolidated the conservative 
reform agenda of labor market deregulation, in an acceptance of the ‘reality’ of intensifying 
economic competition created by globalization, yet with a substantial expansion of the social 
safety net, which would not have happened under the conservative leadership. This finding 
indicates that the old politics of the developmental welfare state has been replaced by a new 
politics in which political parties (especially, the political left in an alliance with trade unions) 
have started to make a difference, providing some support for power resources theory in the 
expansion of unemployment protection. The Korean case also suggests that globalization is not 
an ‘objective’ force with an inevitable ‘race to the bottom’, but highlights the continued im-
portance of politics. As in the cases of Sweden and Germany, globalization strengthened the 
position of Korean employers (i.e. the threat to hollow-out manufacturing industries), but this 
strategy found its limits when the East Asian financial crisis discredited employers. Whilst 
business achieved its policy objective of labor market deregulation, it could not prevent the 
improvement of unemployment protection. This and earlier reform episodes show that Korean 
employers, with the state’s loss of control over business, present social policy preferences that 
are very similar to their LME counterparts, suggesting employers’ declining interest in invest-
ing in firm-specific skills. And indeed, from a VoC point of view, it comes with considerable 
surprise that we see the most comprehensive deregulation of the labor market (affecting both 
insiders and outsiders) in the least-likely case of Korea with its traditional predominance of 
firm-specific skills. 
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Conclusions 
The labor markets in all three coordinated market economies examined here have experienced 
far-reaching change since the 1990s, and have effectively abandoned the full employment ob-
jective of their post-war welfare settlements. Sweden and Germany have seen comprehensive 
retrenchment in unemployment protection and a shift towards workfare. The development in-
tensifying the recommodification of labor undermines social solidarity and challenges the egal-
itarianism that was widely associated with coordinated welfare capitalism. In Korea, we have 
observed a departure from the previous welfare-through-work model, which in the past pro-
duced comparatively high levels of social cohesion in the absence of generous social welfare 
provision. In addition, all three countries have deregulated temporary employment, undermin-
ing regular employment that long characterized their labor market and welfare regimes. Only 
regular workers in Korea have also seen a decline in employment protection. Labor market 
insiders in Germany and Sweden have been spared labor market deregulation. 
These empirical developments call into question the emphasis on stability that is typi-
cally associated with the institutionalist study of CMEs, which have not only experienced a 
decline in social solidarity but also a decline in coordination. In both Sweden and Germany, 
we have seen the erosion of the post-war compromise that allowed generous social policies and 
support for the unemployed. In the face of greater competitive pressures, increased employer 
opposition to social welfare provision challenged the cross-class alliance that brought stability 
for so long. The decline in partisan difference, especially with social democracy ideologically 
moving towards the political center and accepting retrenchment and workfare, put trade unions 
further on the defensive. The persistence of unemployment weakened trade unions, and 
strengthened the bargaining position of employers. Critically, in Sweden, social democracy 
appears to have lost its hegemonic status, and the center-right is in a position to engage in 
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retrenchment without electoral repercussion. As far as the German case is concerned, the argu-
ment of a decline of social partnership and coordination is particularly notable, as the German 
CME is still widely associated with high levels of coordination and cross-class support.  
In Korea, coordination rested upon a strong state, with growth-oriented bureaucrats 
dominating policy-making. Economic liberalization and democratization challenged the dom-
inance of the bureaucracy and state-led coordination of the developmental (welfare) state. In 
an environment of increased global competitive pressure, business withdrew its support for the 
old welfare-through-work system, and showed increasingly liberal social policy preferences. 
Employers also, breaking with the ‘developmental alliance,’ did not hesitate to loudly voice 
their policy preferences. Yet, whilst important for the deregulation of employment protection, 
employers’ influence in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis was limited, as Korean 
business (unlike their Swedish and German counterparts) was discredited by reckless corporate 
behavior that was thought to have at least contributed to the crisis of the Korean economy. At 
the same time, democratization ended the repression of organized labor, which developed into 
being a champion of the welfare state for both labor market outsiders and insiders. Lastly, 
political parties became a significant agency in social policy-making. Unlike our observations 
in Germany and Sweden, we still find some significant partisan difference in Korea as far as 
unemployment protection is concerned. However, despite some considerable welfare state ex-
pansion, the decline in employment protection has made Korea more ‘liberal.’ 
To conclude, our examination of Sweden, Germany, and Korea –three critical cases in 
the study of coordinated welfare capitalism– not only questions the assumption of relative sta-
bility that is commonly associated with the study of CMEs, but also the assertion that this 
stability is associated with the persistence of established political coalitions. Instead, we con-
tend, across all three cases, a collapse of old welfare state coalitions as key political driver of 
labor market reform, with the withdrawal of employers from previous welfare settlements at 
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the heart of this development. Importantly, regardless of the institutional context (that is, social-
democratic, conservative-corporatist or developmental welfare), employers in all three coun-
tries increasingly behave like their LME counterparts with respect to public social welfare pro-
vision and employment protection – undermining the argument of cross-class coalitions in re-
cent welfare reforms in CMEs. Whilst business responded to perceived pressure from globali-
zation, (partisan) policy-makers also responded to perceived fiscal constraints. Our findings, 
thus, very much challenge the VoC argument of “limited movement”139 in CMEs in the face 
of globalization, which shifted power resources in favor of employers. Despite considerable 
liberalization in coordinated welfare capitalism, this is not to argue that we are simply converg-
ing to one model of capitalism, but that the observed decline of social solidarity and coordina-
tion suggests that all three countries are in a state of flux, which has not been fully acknowl-
edged in the literature. The findings call for greater empirical scrutiny in the study of coordi-
nated welfare capitalism, and for greater scrutiny in the comparison of CMEs and LMEs, so as 
to be in a better position to assess to what extent CMEs and LMEs might or might not be 
converging.   
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